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LIST OF PARTIES 
The appellant has not specifically Identified the parties in this 
action. 
For the purpoes of clarity, The parties are listed below: 
1. Appellant/ Petitioner, Henry C. Hopkins, Inmate at the Central 
Utah Correctional Facility. 
2. Appellee/ Respondent, The UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS. 
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OTHER PROVISIONS; 
The Utah sentence and release guidelines of 1983-85, with house bill 
209, Appx. H 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District court 
dismissing a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Jurisdiction over this, 
appeal, pursuant to U.C.A. § 77-35-26 (2)(a) 1953 as amended and U.C.A. 
§ 78-2-2 (3)(h) 1953 as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Appellant/petitioner contends that the Utah Board of Pardons 
is treating his case as a Indeterminate Life Sentence, to 
which it is not. Also that the arbitrary decision made by the 
Board of Pardons is without reason(s) in departure of his Five 
(5) year term of Imprisonment for a first degree felony, set 
out by Utah!s 1983 Legislation, house bill 209, establishing 
Mandatory Sentences on first degree sex offenses. 
II. Appellant/petitioner contends that the Information used in 
his sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual 
term of Imprisonment, is also being used by the Board of 
Pardons. And that the reason for given him a rehearing needs 
to be more definite in factual Information for such a de-
parture without reason. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a District Court's order for a dismissal of Civil 
Habeas Corpus Complaint, for not being Meritorious. 
The appellant court must determine whether a proper dismissal is 
the case. And if so, the appellant is to give deference to the lower 
court on all Issues of fact. Whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, reversing the lower court's finding only when the record 
shows that those findings are clearly erroneous or wholly unsupported 
by the evidence. State v. Michell, 779 P.2d 1116,1118 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153,154-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Nephi City 
v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673,674 (Utah 1989); Branam v. Provo School Dist., 
780 P.2d 810,811 (Utah 1989). See: Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 
(1963). In Townsend, The supreme court stated, A hearing is required 
for Inadequately developed evidence, this right is limited to cases in 
which the lack of evidence was not caused by petitioner's "Inexcusable 
Neglect'/ Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313,317 "Inexcusable Neglect" is, in 
turn, defined as petitioner's "Knowing and Intelligent Waiver" of the 
right to present the evidence. Id. 317. 
IN THE PRESENT CASE 
Appellant/petitioner requested a evidentiary hearing in his petit-
ion to put on evidence to show and prove substantial violations by the 
Utah Board of Pardons on September 18, 1991. And that the lower court 
denied his Utah Constitutional rights of Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 
the court Intentionally sheilded the Board of Pardons arbitrary actions. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On September 18, 1991. Appellant/petioner went before the Utah Board 
of Pardons, on a original hearing, after serving three years of his man-
datory five (5) year term of Imprisonment, for a mitigating offense of 
Sec. 76-5-405. Of the U.C.A. Only to recieve an arbitrary decision by 
the board member's in his case. 
That the board member's stated that they had in thier possesion a 
committment order by the court, for a fifteen (15) years to life and 
that his Guidelines was 110 months, because he was in the catagory of 
poor. And thus the board members were considering a rehearing in ten 
(10) years, with an alienist report to determine whether it would be 
appropriate to parole him at that time. 
Appellant/petitioner contested that Information the best he could. 
By stating that he should be granted a parole date in September of 1993, 
to a halfway House in the salt lake area, for the following reasons; 
1) It would not detract from the seriousness of the crime. 
2) It would not Jeaperdize the public. 
Appellant/petitioner made other allegations, that he was being den 
ied due process, in the hearing, that he was not recieveing a full and 
fair hearing by three Imparial members, also that the Information 
being used was false or fraudulent upon him. 
The board member's set his case under advisement. Meanwhile, appel-
lant/petitioner obtained and sent the following legal document(s) (1) 
original committment order (2) classification reassesment. the only two 
legal documents he could use in his defense, which in turn had a few 
defects in them, also a letter stating he had been prujudice by the 
board member's that day Sept. 18, 1991. 
Appellant/ petitioner recieved a notice from the Board of Pardons 
stating, based on the Information submitted to them in the record, by 
the appellant/ petitioner. No Change, rehearing in May of 1995. 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
Because the appellant/ petitioner did not recieve a full and fair 
hearing by the Utah Board of Pardons, in that the board members refused 
to hold the standards set out by the Utah Supreme Court, in Foote v. 
Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah adv. rep. 3 (1991). The Supreme Court, 
stated: 
It is the province of the Judiciary to assure that a claim 
of the denial of due process by an arm of Government be heard 
and, if Justified, that it be vindicated. What may constitute 
due process in any given circumstance may very, but assuredly, 
the parole board is not outside the constitutional mandate 
that the actions of the Government must afford due process of 
Law. 
Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); cf. Andrews 
v. Haun, 779 P.2d 229 (Utah 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
In the present case, appellant/petitioner also contends that he 
has been denied the equal protection of the Law, and thus may constitute 
due process in any given circumstance. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 
605, 18 L.Ed 2d 326, 87 S.ct 1209 (1967). 
POINT I 
Appellant/petitioner contends that the Utah Board of Pardons 
is treating his case as a Indeterminate Life sentence, to which 
it is not. Also that the arbitrary decision made by the Board 
of Pardons is without reason(s) in departure of his five (5) 
year term of Imprisonment for a first degree felony, set out by 
UtahTs 1983 Legislation, house bill 209, establishing Mandatory 
Sentences on first degree sex offenses. 
Indeterminate sentence is Invalid where the controlling statute 
prescribes a sentence for a definite term. State ex rel. Nicholson 
v. Boles, 148 W va 229, 134 Se 2d 576. 
The Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines, 1983-85 Legislation, 
house bill209, Appx. H. Where ineffect states: 
U.C.A. 1988-89. 76-3-201. Sentencing. 
(5)(a) If the statute under which the defendant was convicted 
mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall 
be Imposed, the court shall order Imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
The Utah Board of Pardons is in conflict with Utah's 1983 Legis-
lation, establishing mandatory sentences, for those convicted of first 
degree sex offenses. Similarly, 
If mitigating circumstances can be established, the basic mand-
atory (middle severity) term of ten (10) years, should be reduced to 
the five (5) year term. (The truth in sentencing). 
The Legislation also stated in house bill 209 states; "The re-
sponsibility to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
case rests with the Individual Judge." not the board of pardons. 
However, The record in appellant/petitioner sentencing hearing in 
State v. Hopkins, Sept. 23, 1988. Togather with relevant factual Info-
rmation supplied to the Judge, to determine a Just sentence. Indicates 
that the Judge found that there was only mitigating circumstances. 
And therefore sentence him to the mandatory term of five (5) years, 
( which may be for Life o_r to Life ). 
The above statutory language, " which may be for Life err to Life," 
is the operational of house bill 209, in the offense severity rateings 
of the mandatory matrixs, calls for three (3) years for each prior con-
viction. ( Life, if more then 2 ) prior conviction(s) of the following 
violations of; child kidnapping, 76-5-301.1; rape or attempted rape of 
child, 76-5-402.1; object rape or attempted object rape of child, 76-
5-402.2; sodomy of child, 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of child, 
76-5-404.(3); or aggravated sexual assualt, 76-5-405. 
The above clearly shows and proves that this appellant/petitioner 
is not on a life sentence, either, indeterminate o_r mandatory. Nor is 
he serving additional sentence for prior convictions of the same. 
Furthermore, the board of pardons should utilize the guide lines in 
all itfs hearings. It should consider the sentence imposed by the Judge 
as the minimum term if the sentence is consistent, with the guide lines, 
If the sentence differs from the guide-lines, the board should evaluate 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances noted by the Judge. 
If the board feels differently about these circumstances, then the 
court, they should notify the court of the reason for the disagreement 
and the action taken by the board, (citation original). 
The actions of the Board of Pardons to Intentionally to change the 
statutory guide lines, that is regulated by the Utah Sentence and Rel-
ease guide lines and house bill 209 of 1983-85 legislation. To compen-
sate their feelings or belief, is in violation of the ex post facto 
clause. Allen v. Hadden, cited as 536 F.Supp. 586 (1982). The Tenth 
Circuit Court stated; That a problem arises when the commission changes 
the guide lines between the date an offense is committed and the date 
of a prisoner parole determination, regulations, like statutes, 
are coverd by the ex post facto clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9. cl. 3 
Rodriguez v. U.S Parole Commission, 549 F.2d 170,173 ( 7th
 Cir. 1979 ). 
In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.ct. 960, 67 L.ED. 2d 17 (1981). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, established a two-part test to determine if a 
Law is ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occuring before its enactment, it must disavantage the offen-
der affected by it. Id. 29, 101 S.ct. (citations omitted). 
The Law need not, however, Impair a "vested right" to violate the ex 
post facto prohibition. Id. 
Critical to relief under the ex post facto clause is not 
Individual's right to less punishment, but lack of fair 
notice and governmental restraint, when the legislature 
increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the 
crime was consumated. 
Id. at 30, 101 S.ct. at 965. Thus, the parole commission may not retro-
spectively apply a new regulation if the result would be more onerous 
to the prisoner. Rodriguez v. U.S. Parole Commission, 594 F.2d at 173 
- 76; See: Hayward v. U.S. Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 857- 862 (8 t h 
Cir. 1981). If the new regulations would have a more onerous effect at 
the time he committed the crime(s), the commision must apply the earl-
ier regulation. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,435-36 (1987). The 
defendant in Miller, convicted of sexual battery, recieved a seven year 
sentence through application of five and one half to seven-year sent-
enceing range in floridaTs newly revised sentencing guide lines. Id. 
at 428. previous guide lines effective at the time of defendant's 
criminal act provided for a three and one half to four year sentence. 
Id. The Supreme Court held that the application of the revised guide 
lines to the defendant change the legal consequences of his act and 
thus constituted an ex post facto violation. Id. at 435-36. 
IN THE PRESENT CASE 
The appellant/petitioner was sentence by the court in strict com-
pliance of house bill 209, of the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
1983-85. And that the Utah Board of Pardons cannot abuse Judicial powers 
State v. Kelly, cited as 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989). 
In this Jurisdiction, it is the settled rule that the sentence 
Imposed is within the discreation of the trial court, so long 
as the sentence dose not exceed the prescribed statutory limits 
or the JudgeTs authority. 
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988); State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 
984 (Utah 1986); State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981). We will reverse only for abuse of 
that discreation. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (1989). 
POINT II 
II. Appellanat/petitioner contends that the Information used in 
his sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual 
term of Imprisonment, is also being used by the Board of 
Pardons. And that the reason for given him a rehearing needs 
to be more definite in factual Information for such a depar-
ture without reason. 
Appellant/petitioner recieved a notice from the board of pardons 
in that there was a listing of fourteen (14) aggravating factors used 
in determination of there decision. Also that the expiration of his 
sentence stated Life, to which it is not; appellant/petitioner also 
states that some of the aggravating factors, have no basis, and he 
contends that they do not have material relevancy to them, or to him. 
Also some of the aggravated factors are Identical to those use in his 
sentenceing phase by the court to determine the actual term of Im-
prisonment. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; U.S. 
v. Miller, 874 F.2d 466,471 (7 t h Cir. 1989); In Joost v. U.S. Parole 
Commission, 698 F.2d 418,419 (10 t h Cir. 1983)(per curiam). Parole Comm-
ission must furnish more then standard reason to Justify parole denial 
that exceeds guide lines and must show good cause for continued 
Incarceration. However, many courts prohibit the parole commission 
from using factors to Justify exceeding the guide lines recommand-
ations for a parolee if those were used in determining the severity 
or salient factor score. Such practice is called "double counting" 
and is an Impermissible abuse of discretion. Maddox v. U.S. Parole 
Commission, 821 F.2d 997,1002 (5 t h Cir. 1987). See: Greenhotz v. 
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corrections, 442 U.S. 1,9-11, 99 
S.ct. 2100,2104-2105, L.Ed. 2d 668 (1979). The U.S. Supreme Court 
consider a state parole system. The court noted that a parole-rel 
ease decision "depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are 
factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisal by the 
board members..." Id. at 10, 99 S.ct. at 2105. Although the court 
undertook an analysis of statutory language, the majority noted that 
[F]our members of this court are of the view that the existance of a 
Liberty Interest in parole release is not solely a function of the 
wording of the governing statute". Id. at 373 n.3. Justice Marshall, 
Brennan, and Stevens have argued that "all prisoners potentially eli-
gible for parole have a Liberty Interest of which they may not be de-
prived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory 
language that Implements the parole system." Grenholtz, 442 U.S. at 22 
(emphasis in original). Justice Powell has stated that "the presence 
of a parole system is sufficient to create a Liberty-Interest, protec-
ted by the constitution, in parole-release decision." Id. at 19. See: 
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). In Allen, The Supreme 
Court found that the language of the Montana statute governing parole 
eligibility created a protected Liberty Interest. Although the statute 
directed that the Board "Shall" release prisoners "When" the criteria 
are met, while the statute in Greenholtz stated that prisoners "Shall" 
be released "Unless" certain reasons require Imprisonment, the court 
saw no difference in the mandatory character of the language. 
IN THE PRESENT CASE 
Appellant/petitioner request this court to Interpet the mandatory 
language of their statutory law of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Sec. 77-27-9. (2)(a) Parole Proceedings: 
Not withstanding any other provisions of Law, a person sentence 
to prison for a felony of the first degree Involving... is not 
eligible for release on parole by the board of pardons untill 
the offender has fully completed serving the minimum mandatory 
sentence Imposed by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all the above Information submitted in pro/se to the 
Utah Supreme Court, it is hereby requested that this court remand 
the appellant/petitioner case to the district court, for relief sought 
in his petition. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED. 
NO REPLY BRIEF WILL BE FILED IN THIS MATTER. 
Dated this Z day of FEB,. ,1992 
HenE7 c. HopTcins Pro /se 
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